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Abstract 
Are general lockdowns an appropriate response to the threat of Covid-19?  Recent cost-benefit 
studies do not favour the case for them.  Instead, since the virus practises a form of age 
discrimination (approximately 90% of coronavirus deaths are older than 65), some analysts 
have suggested an alternative.  It is that younger citizens -- the generation worst affected by 
lockdowns and the one that will predominantly pay the eventual tax bill for furlough -- should 
be allowed to return to work to sustain the economy.  Lockdown advocates argue that this 
would be dangerous, because older people would get infected by young workers living in the 
same home.  We explore that claim.  We find that 96% of UK workers under age 40 do not live 
with anyone over 65.  In fact, 92% of all UK workers live in a household without anyone over 
65 years old – and that holds true for white and BAME workers.  Releasing young workers 
would thus expose only a small fraction of older citizens to intra-household transmission, 
although we recognize that the absolute number of people infected might eventually become 
considerable, and some vulnerable citizens could potentially be at risk if they live in large 
households.  In general this paper’s results illustrate the potential value of fine-tuning the lifting 
of restrictions.  Our findings buttress the cost-benefit case for age-based policies. 
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Age-Based Policy in the Context of the Covid-19 Pandemic: How Common are Multi-
Generational Households? 
 
 
“Covid-19: Experts divide into two camps of action—shielding versus blanket policies.” BMJ September 2020. bmj.m3702 
 
“The most pertinent epidemiological feature of COVID-19 [is] …89% of … mortalities over age 65.  This … suggests that the harm caused 
by uniform strategies…will outweigh the benefits…Our strategy should therefore target interventions to protect those most at risk” Gupta et 
al. 2020. 
 
“To cut a cohort of ‘vulnerable’ people off from ‘non-vulnerable’ or ‘less vulnerable’ is likely to prove practically impossible, especially for 
disadvantaged groups (e.g. those living in cramped housing and multi-generational households). Greenhalgh et al. 2020 
 
“The idea that you could completely separate the fifth of the population who are aged over 65 [for example] is … implausible…and … it 
would be age-based apartheid” Simon Stephens in the BMJ, September 2020. 
https://www.bmj.com/content/370/bmj.m3788 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is disagreement about the optimal way to design a Covid-19 policy.  
Understandably, the pandemic has provoked a great deal of emotion -- and, in some cases, even 
vitriolic exchanges among scientists about the best course of action.  These difficult issues are 
likely to continue to matter well into 2021 and indeed beyond that if there are new pandemics.   
During 2020 most governments implemented a full or partial lockdown approach.  
However, some scientists and business leaders have argued instead for targeted restrictions that 
bear in mind the large numbers of citizens (especially the young) who face comparatively little 
risk from coronavirus.   
Is there a case for ‘age-based’ Covid-19 policy?  This study provides evidence on the 
possible perils of age segmentation that have been put forward by epidemiologists and public 
health experts.   The key claim is that young workers cannot be safely ‘released’ because they 
often live in multigenerational households.  But is that true?  This paper provides some of the 
first estimates of the extent of multi-generational living in the UK.  Using data on 
approximately 2.5 million people from 10 pooled years of the Labour Force Survey, it 
concludes that the vast majority of workers do not live with anyone older than, for example, 
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age 65.  This finding sheds doubt on some of the arguments put forward by the large group1  
who have believed, and who continue to believe, the UK should use general lockdowns.  
BACKGROUND 
The aim of lockdown restrictions is to reduce transmission by attempting to keep people 
away from one another.  That kind of policy has a natural logic and in practice has probably 
been helpful towards achieving its stated intention.  Nevertheless, the policy has necessarily 
produced a large loss of social contact and huge economic losses.  Speeches by UK government 
ministers typically do not mention or quantify those kinds of social and economic losses (as, 
for example, in Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s evening presentation when announcing the so-
called second lockdown in November 2020, in which only health data were shown to the 
television audience).  At the time of writing, the Financial Times has estimated that the public 
borrowing deficit this year will be 350 billion pounds or more.  That equates to a lump sum of 
more than 10,000 pounds per worker in the UK.  The debt continues to rise and will eventually 
have to be repaid.  Various authors have started to ask whether the cure is worse than the disease 
(see Dorling 2020, for example). 
To our knowledge, no formal Covid-19 cost-benefit analysis of pandemic policy has 
been done by SAGE (the scientific advisory group for emergencies) or the UK government.  
However, a number of economists (Miles et al. 2020, Reddy 2020, Rowthorn and Maciejowski 
2020) have published systematic studies.  All three papers point out that standard kinds of cost-
benefit calculations do not suggest that lockdowns are desirable (De Neve et al. 2020 is also 
                                                          
1 It may be fair to characterize the pro-lockdown group as largely epidemiologists and public health professionals.  
The current paper, by contrast, looks at what might be described as social science evidence on the nature of societal 
living arrangements, about which epidemiologists and public health professionals presumably would not claim 
special knowledge.  The ideal would be for different scientific communities to work together in a cooperative 
spirit, as has been advocated in various fora by Gus O’Donnell.  It may not be widely realized, for example, that 
SAGE (the government’s scientific advisory group for emergencies) had from the start, and apparently still has, 
no economists on it. 
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doubtful).  The main intuitive reason for this -- though it can sound harsh -- is that those people 
likely to die from Covid-19 are elderly, so that lockdowns, which are extremely expensive in 
terms of national resources, are primarily saving relatively few quality-adjusted life years 
(QALYs).   To put that in a different way, it is not fair-minded to deny our children, 
grandchildren and many unborn citizens the resources that could otherwise have been spent on 
their future hospitals, schools, defence, medicines, and much else.  
Even on health grounds, some scientists doubt the efficacy of lockdowns.  For example, 
two opposing open-letters appeared in the UK press in mid-September 2020.  The first, 
objecting to government policy, was by Gupta et al (2020) 2.  The second, objecting to the 
objectors, was by Greenhalgh et al (2020).  Slightly after that, the Great Barrington Declaration 
was publicized, and then a further group published a critique of that.  The Greenhalgh letter 
included the sentence “It is more important than ever to consider multiple perspectives on the 
issues and encourage interdisciplinary debate …”.  Despite the avowed sentiment3, its 24 
signatories were almost all from the same disciplinary background.  No economist, for 
example, signed the letter, and as far as we know no economist was asked to do so. 
It is necessary to accept that any policy will have disadvantages.  All decisions will be 
painful.  The optimal strategy is presumably one that weighs up different ‘harms’ to society4. 
KEY QUESTIONS AND POLICY 
                                                          
2 For transparency, it should perhaps be recorded that one of the two authors of the current paper signed the first 
open letter, and that neither of the two authors signed the Great Barrington Declaration. 
3 Unfortunately, this kind of behavior-conflicting-with-what-writers-claim-to-want-in-others is not uncommon.  
On November 22 2020, a journalist called Sonia Sodha wrote an article in the Observer castigating the authors of 
the Great Barrington Declaration.  Her article stated that “it is essential for the status quo to be challenged, but 
[those who do so] need to draw on evidence”.  She went on to say that her objection to Great Barrington was that 
“it would be pretty much impossible … for 30%-40% of the population to lock themselves away for … well over 
a year.”  Despite what she said she expected of others, Ms Sodha presented no evidence for her claim.  Relevant 
facts are that (i) the over 65s constitute only 18% of the population, for example, and (ii) the UK managed to lock 
away approximately the whole of its population for some months in late Spring and the majority of its population 
for large parts of 2020. 
4 We have been influenced here by John Broome’s 2017 book Weighing Goods and by Oswald (2015). 
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Some of the contentious ethical questions include the following: 
 Is it morally justifiable to leave decades of debt to the younger generation, including 
the unborn, in order to extend somewhat the lives of those who are already old? 5  
 Is it more justifiable to lock down regions than age groups? 
 Is it the responsibility of young people to stay away from other young people?  Or 
is it the responsibility of the old to stay away from the virus? 
Some of the contentious practical and scientific questions include the following: 
 Exactly how effective and costly are lockdowns? 
 Is it feasible, and reasonably safe, to rely on a natural build-up of so-called herd 
immunity? 
 Would an age-based lockdown, or set of restrictions, be feasible and safe? 
 If it takes a long time for a vaccine to be distributed to the public, or the effects of 
a vaccine quickly wear off, are there strategies other than general lockdowns that 
could control the virus? 
This paper is especially concerned with the possible case for a ‘release’ of younger workers. 6   
It will not focus primarily on ethics, although we do view the moral issues as something that 
should be seriously debated in a democratic nation. 
ONS data show that at the time of writing approximately 300 people under the age of 
40 have died in the UK, while above age 40 the number of deaths exceeds 50,000.  The 
asymmetry is thus striking.  Pro-lockdown advocates believe that it would be a mistake to 
release the young.  They argue that younger people should not be allowed to resume normal 
                                                          
5 This has been termed the ‘fair innings’ issue by researchers such as Paul Dolan of LSE; see for example  Tsuchiya 
et al. (2003). 
6 The literature is now fairly large and we will not attempt to survey it.  Early writings included Acemoglu et al. 
(2020), Eastwood (2020), Ichino et al. (2020), and papers by Oswald and Powdthavee. 
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life because they would quickly infect the old.  That sentiment has a ring of common sense on 
its side.  Its persuasiveness does depend, however, on the empirical question: are multi-
generational households common or rare?  
DATA 
The current study examines data from the recent Labour Force Survey.  The LFS allows 
us to provide estimates of the extent of multi-generational living in the modern UK.  The overall 
sample size used for the estimates is approximately 2.4 million citizens.  Subsamples, including 
for white and BAME individuals, are also examined later in the paper. 
We concentrate on adults who live in private households.  The target population of the 
LFS is based on the general resident population in the United Kingdom. Specifically, the LFS 
aims to include all people who live in private households, or are resident in National Health 
Service accommodation, or are young people living away from the parental home in a student 
hall of residence or similar institution during term time. (This latter group is included in the 
LFS sample specifically to improve the coverage of young people.) 
The 2001 and 2011 Population Census definitions state that communal establishments 
(CEs) provide managed residential accommodation.  Examples of CEs include residential care 
homes and university halls of residence. LFS outputs relate almost exclusively to the 
population living in private households, and exclude most of the population living in CEs. The 
later analysis does not cover people in care homes or other institutionalized settings like 
prisons.   
RESULTS 
 For presentational clarity, we reply mainly upon pie charts.  The analysis initially 
considers the possibility of a release of workers who are relatively young.  Then we consider 
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the sample of workers of all ages.  Throughout the analysis we define workers as those in 
employment, self-employment, in training, or looking for a job. 
Figure 1 reveals how rare it is for young UK workers to live in a household with adults 
who are over the age of 65.  Here we take an initial cut-off of age 40 as the upper end of 
‘young’.  The diagram shows that approximately 96% of workers under the age of 40 have no-
one in their home who is older than 65.  As a guide to reading the pie chart, the red area in 
Figure 1 depicts the proportion of younger workers in the population who have at least one 
person in their household who is over the age of 65. 
The next set of diagrams move to consider the UK workforce as a whole.  Here we 
deliberately present a variety of different age cut-offs.   
Figure 2 shows that in fact the vast majority of (all) workers do not live with anyone 
who is age 65 or above.  The exact proportion, as demonstrated in the pie chart, is 91.8% of 
the working population.  The remainder, 8.2%, have one or more than one person older than 
65 as part of their household.  Within the diagram, the large green area depicts workers in the 
population who have nobody in their household who is over the age of 65.  The smaller red 
area depicts workers in the population who have at least one person in their household who is 
over the age of 65. 
Figures 3 and 4 are variants on the same diagram.  They use two different age cut-offs.  
Figure 3 reveals that 83.3% of workers have nobody over age 60 in their household.  Figure 4 
is the equivalent calculation for a cut-off defined on age 55.  The figure is then 70.7%. 
BAME HOUSEHOLDS 
 Might some ethnic groups be different?  It has sometimes been said in public debate 
that BAME (black, Asian, minority, ethnic) households tend to have a different age structure 
and family makeup than white households.  Health experts have, reasonably enough, expressed 
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concern about this possibility.  They have argued that older BAME men and women would be 
more vulnerable to a release of younger workers. 
 Figures 5 and 6 shed some doubt on that.  In both cases, for white workers and BAME 
workers, the proportion of workers who live in a house that has no person over age 65 is 
approximately the same, at 92%. 
Nevertheless, there is an important complication here.  Consider the current empirical 
question posed in a somewhat different way (in essence, the other way around, one might say).  
The earlier diagrams have revealed how many workers are in a household with one or more 
older persons.  Now consider instead how many households with an older person contain one 
or more workers.  Figures A1 and A2 inquire into that empirical question, and do so separately 
for white and BAME individuals.  Figure A1 shows that approximately 14% of white citizens 
over the age of 65 have at least one younger worker in the house.  Figure A2 demonstrates that 
that number is far larger for BAME men and women – it is approximately 41%.  This means 
that those in BAME households, when viewed as families rather than individual workers, are 
at greater risk, in numerical terms, than those in white households.  Although the diagrams of 
Figures 5 and 6 hold good for both main ethnic groupings, it is the case that if a BAME worker 
became infected there would a somewhat larger potential spread from him or her.  
CONCLUSIONS 
“Lockdowns and restrictions cause immense economic, social and non-Covid health damage, and we’ve got to start talking 
about those so that we know the restrictions we’re being asked to live under are not causing more harm than good to our 
citizens.” Steve Baker, MP for Wycombe.  Quoted in the FT, 19 November 2020. 
 
When the Covid-19 pandemic began, politicians around the globe had to decide how to 
react.  There were, and are, no costless options.  Emotions have run high.   Policymakers have 
had to weigh ‘harms’, it might be said, and to attempt to choose the fairest and least painful 
strategy.  In 2020 nearly all countries opted to use blanket kinds of lockdown restrictions of a 
kind unprecedented in post-war peacetime.   
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It is now known, admittedly with the help of hindsight, that young people’s mental 
health consequences and unemployment experiences were far more severe during lockdown 
than among older groups (Banks and Xu, 2020; Xiong et al. 2020; IFS 2020).  Even before that 
was discovered, however, there were at least two reasons to believe that blanket restrictions 
risked inter-generational unfairness: 
(i) The young were known from the early Chinese data to be at much milder risk 
from the virus, so the young had less to gain from lockdowns; 
(ii) The large debts inevitably built up by furlough and other support schemes would 
have to be repaid principally by the younger generation (including, very 
probably, some of the unborn). 
Hence, although the moral issues were not widely discussed in the world’s media in Spring 
2020, it might be argued that even from the start the young were not treated in a way that was 
self-evidently ethically justifiable. 7 
 A number of analysts suggested at the start of the crisis, and have since, that an efficient 
strategy for COVID-19 could be designed around the known epidemiological fact that younger 
citizens are mostly invulnerable, or nearly invulnerable, to the virus, while older citizens are 
very disproportionately the ones at risk.  Those analysts argued that in principle the economy 
could be run by younger people while the older at-risk adults stayed out of the way until a 
vaccine was discovered.8  Large numbers of epidemiologists and public health researchers 
                                                          
7 The two authors of the current paper wish to record that they do not have a completely firm view on the morality 
of locking down a society.  Reasonable people can differ on ethical questions.  We do, however, believe that the 
ethics of intergenerational effects of coronavirus policy is a complicated area that should have been debated more 
openly, and that it was not immediately obvious that the old had a right to expect the young to lock themselves 
away.  
8 Sanjay Reddy has pointed out to us that a sensible policy stance might seek to provide 'focused protection' to the 
elderly not merely through moral injunctions but providing financial and practical supports, and to enable those 
who live with them to avoid risks (e.g. by staying home from work, by temporarily moving elsewhere, by 
undergoing frequent testing etc.). The idea of 'conditional cash transfers', much vaunted in some developing 
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vehemently opposed this.9  One reason was, they argued, that the existence of multigenerational 
households -- in the sense of workers living with the old who are particularly vulnerable -- 
makes age segmentation infeasible.  Those epidemiologists and public health researchers 
presented no evidence (as far as we know) for that view.   
The results in this paper, which appear to be the first of their kind, demonstrate that in 
fact 10 only a tiny percentage of young UK workers live in a household with anyone over, say, 
age 65.   A critic could reasonably object that, even so, a release of the young might not prevent 
all forms of contact between younger (therefore safer) adults and older (therefore intrinsically 
more vulnerable) adults11.  Nevertheless, the extent of multi-generational living is an important 
element in any calculation of this general sort, and it is now known that much of coronavirus 
transmission goes on within households and that older individuals are the most susceptible to 
household transmission12. 
A number of caveats should be pointed out. 13  First, we do not yet know, and cannot 
yet know, the effect of so-called ‘long Covid’ on the young, but that possibility needs to be 
borne in mind in case new evidence does emerge in the future.  Second, this paper does not 
look at interactions outside the household. Perhaps the most significant of these might be where 
grandparents provide day-care for their grandchildren, whether either in the child’s home, or 
in their grandparents’ home for some days a week (of course this presents difficult issues for 
                                                          
country contexts, may be applicable here, but practical supports, such as grocery deliveries, could also be offered.  
Such measures would have a small cost in comparison to some of those being now undergone by the whole society. 
9 An unfortunate aspect of this is that emotive language was sometimes used, and ethical judgments made, by the 
scientific advisers who were on advisory panels for their medical knowledge and not for their ability to make 
better moral judgments than any other member of society.  An extreme example, in our view, was the statement 
by Simon Stephens, the head of the National Health Service, that age segmentation would be a form of age 
‘apartheid’.  Mr Stephens, who did PPE at Oxford and is not a doctor, is entitled to his view; but his ethical opinion 
is not one that is rooted in medical science or biology or any other scientific discipline. 
10 Of course it is not rare for parents to live with young children, but that is not what has been meant by 
multigenerational living in the context of the coronavirus debate.  
11 This is true of any kind of policy, however. 
12  https://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473-3099(20)30471-0/fulltext 
13  We thank Danny Dorling for a number of these. 
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all policies).  Third, at the time of writing there is hope of three potential vaccines, so the elderly 
may not have to isolate for too long14 . 
As the current pandemic continues, and more generally in planning for future 
pandemics, we believe that epidemiologists and public health researchers’ claims about the 
nature of society need to be scrutinized more carefully.  Those researchers are well qualified 
to make medical and biological judgments.  They are not so well qualified to make social 
science judgments. 
  
                                                          
14  Given the likely arrival of a vaccine in 2021, it might even be wondered whether there could be a case for the 
unusual idea of the government temporarily subsidizing unused hotel rooms, say, for young workers who happen 
to be living with someone over the age of 65 — so that they could go to work and come back to an accommodation 
where the risk of passing on anything they catch to people in their household was minimized.  
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Figure 1.  A Tiny Proportion of Young UK Workers Live with Older People  
[where younger is defined as under age 40, and the cut-off definition for older is over age 65] 
 
 
Note: In this diagram ‘younger’ is being under age 40.  The definition of ‘older’ is being over 
age 65.  As a guide to reading this diagram, the green area depicts younger workers in the 
population who have nobody in their household who is over the age of 65.  The red area 
depicts younger workers in the population who have at least one person in their household 
who is over the age of 65.  It can be seen that approximately 96% per cent of younger UK 
workers do not, on this definition, live with an older person. 
no > 65 denotes nobody over age 65. 
 
 
 
 
  
96.3%
3.7%
no >65
at least one >65
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Figure 2.  A Small Proportion of All UK Workers Live with Older People [where the cut-
off definition for older is over age 65] 
 
 
 
Note: The definition of ‘older’ here is being over age 65.  As a guide to reading this diagram, 
the green area depicts all workers in the population who have nobody in their household who 
is over the age of 65.  The red area depicts workers in the population who have at least one 
person in their household who is over the age of 65.  It can be seen that approximately 92 per 
cent of UK workers do not, on this definition, live with an older person. 
no>65 denotes nobody over age 65. 
  
91.8%
8.2%
no >65
at least one >65
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Figure 3.  Proportions Calculated Using Instead an Age Cut-Off of 60 [this diagram, which 
is for all workers, is a variant on Figure 2] 
 
 
Note: The definition of ‘older’ here is being over age 60.  As a guide to reading this diagram, 
the green area depicts workers in the population who have nobody in their household who is 
over the age of 60.  The red area depicts workers in the population who have at least one person 
in their household who is over the age of 60.  It can be seen that approximately 83 per cent of 
UK workers do not, on this definition, live with an older person. 
no>60 denotes nobody over age 60. 
  
83.3%
16.7%
no >60
at least one >60
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Figure 4.  Proportions Calculated Using Instead an Age Cut-Off of 55 [this diagram, which 
is for all workers, is a variant on Figure 2] 
 
 
Note: The definition of ‘older’ here is being over age 55.  As a guide to reading this diagram, 
the green area depicts workers in the population who have nobody in their household who is 
over the age of 55.  The red area depicts workers in the population who have at least one person 
in their household who is over the age of 55.  It can be seen that approximately 71 per cent of 
UK workers do not, on this definition, live with an older person. 
no>55 denotes nobody over age 55. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
70.7%
29.3%
no >55
at least one >55
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Figure 5.  The Proportions of White Workers Living with at Least One Older Person [a further 
variant of Figure 2, with a set of older age cut-offs shown] White Subsample 
 
 
Note. Here the different colours signify the proportion of workers who live with people of 
different ages.  Hence the yellow colour depicts the proportion of UK workers who live with 
an older adult between the age of 66 and the age of 75 (there are 6.4% workers in that kind of 
household). 
no>65 denotes nobody over age 65, and so on for the other categories. 
  
91.8%
6.4%
1.4%
0.4%
no >65 66-75
76-85 85+
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Figure 6.  The Proportions of BAME Workers Living with at Least One Older Person [a further 
variant of Figure 2, with a set of older age cut-offs shown] BAME Subsample 
 
 
 
Note. Here the different colours signify the proportion of workers who live with people of 
different ages.  Hence the yellow colour depicts the proportion of UK workers who live with 
an older adult between the age of 66 and the age of 75 (there are 5.0% workers in that kind of 
household). 
BAME is the acronym for black, Asian, minority, ethnic.  
See also the footnote to Figure 4. 
no>65 denotes nobody over age 65, and so on for the other categories. 
  
92.2%
5.0%
2.2%
0.6%
no >65 66-75
76-85 85+
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APPENDIX: MEASURING THE DATA THE OTHER WAY AROUND 
There is an alternative way to view the data.  It is to be begin not with the worker as the focus but 
instead with the older individual as the focus.  It is then possible to ask a different, but closely related, 
question to the one pursued in the earlier text of the paper: for any given older person, how likely is it 
that that individual lives with a younger person who works?    
This appendix reports evidence in that form.  It initially contains two figure, Figure A1 and Figure A2, 
that each take as its primary unit of observation the older citizen (not the worker). 
 
Figure A1.  How Many Older Citizens [65 plus] Live with at Least One Worker? White Sub-sample 
 
 
Note. In this diagram the total area of the pie represents older citizens, defined here as being 
over age 65. The green area depicts older citizens who have nobody in their household who is 
in the labour force under the age of 65. The different coloured slices represent the proportions 
of older citizens who live with workers in different age groups. Hence, the yellow colour, for 
example, depicts the proportion who live with a worker between 55 to 64 years old; there are 
4.3% of older citizens in that kind of household. Almost 86 percent of older citizens do not 
live in the same household as a worker.  
85.8%
4.3%
3.3%
3.0%
2.2%
1.4%
no <65 55-64 45-54
35-44 26-35 <25
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Figure A2.  How Many Older Citizens [65 plus] Live with at Least One Worker? BAME Sub-sample 
 
Note. In this diagram the total area of the pie represents older citizens, defined here as being 
over age 65. The green area depicts older citizens who have nobody in their household who is 
in the labour force under the age of 65. The different coloured slices represent the proportions 
of older citizens who live with workers in different age groups. Hence, the yellow colour 
depicts the proportion who live with a worker between 55 to 64 years old; there are 3.9% of 
older citizens in that kind of household. Almost 59 percent of older citizens do not live in the 
same household as a worker.  
58.7%
3.9%7.2%
12.0%
11.6%
6.7%
no <65 55-64 45-54
35-44 26-35 <25
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Figure A3.  Workers Living with Older Person [Greater detail on cutoffs compared to Figure 1] 
 
Note.  This is a more detailed version of Figure 1. It gives the breakdown of different age 
groups within the over-65 category. 
no>65 denotes nobody over age 65, and so on for the other categories. 
 
 
 
91.8%
6.4%
1.4%
0.4%
no >65 66-75
76-85 85+
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